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Abstract 
 
Private Equity has been a recent and popular phenomenon all around the world, 
especially since the 1980s. 
Although there are many studies referring to changes within the company, 
something that was never (to our knowledge) studied before was how dividend policies 
would change after the buyout.  
This study developed a model to analyse the 3 years before and after the buyout on 
a sample of European countries from the period 2010-2013, taken from Zephyr. We 
compare how dividends change with the investment of a PE firm, controlling for 
variables like Size, Capital Structure, CAPEX and Profitability, using methods such as 
OLS regression, the T-test and Wilcoxon signed rank test to reach our conclusions on 
the subject. 
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Resumo 
 
Private Equity é um fenómeno relativamente recente em todo o mundo, tendo 
começado a ganhar cada vez mais importância a partir dos anos 1980. 
Embora existam vários estudos que analisam o que acontece dentro da empresa e 
que mudanças lhe estão associadas depois do buyout, algo que nunca foi estudado (que 
tenhamos conhecimento) foi como as políticas de dividendos alteravam depois da 
entrada.  
Este estudo baseia-se no desenvolvimento de um modelo que permite analisar os 3 
anos antes e depois do buyout e perceber como os dividendos alteram e que efeitos 
variáveis como o tamanho da empresa, a estrutura de capitais, as despesas de capital e a 
rentabilidade terão. A amostra de buyouts em países europeus de 2010-2013 foi retirada 
do Zephyr, com os dados posteriormente recolhidos da base de dados Amadeus. Para 
obter os resultados, utilizámos métodos como o OLS, os testes T e o Wilcoxon signed 
rank test.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The goal of this dissertation will be to analyse how dividend policies change when 
a company is invested by a Private Equity Firm, in the European market. 
Private Equity market is sort of a recent phenomenon that started mainly in the 
1980s in the U.S. and, although a slight decrease in the 1990s, came back strongly in the 
2000s, spreading worldwide. Many studies have been conducted to understand what 
kind of changes these investments bring to the target companies, how is their situation 
after the divestment and also how do they compare with similar firms in the industry. 
The literature seems to agree that, mainly in the 1980s, there is evidence of value 
creation mainly due to operational improvements; however, factors like leverage have 
also been proved to be very significant in explaining the created value. But one gap that 
we found in the literature is about how dividends are affected by the buyouts, and that is 
the topic we pretend to research. 
Dividend policies have been studied throughout the years, but these studies are still 
not entirely conclusive – most research, like Fischer Black (1976), tried to understand 
the dividend puzzle, that will be thoroughly explained in the literature review. This 
puzzle centres on the question “why do firms pay dividends?”, and there are theories 
that defend that they are irrelevant, destroy or create value for the shareholders. Despite 
this, evidence seems to agree that dividends, although not creating value, do not seem to 
harm both the company and shareholders; there are even some investors that prefer 
dividend-paying shares. 
We believe this topic will be interesting to develop, since Private Equity firms 
invest in companies with the main purpose of raising money for their investors, either 
by raising dividends or by investing and improving the company, in order for the Equity 
values of the company to be higher and to be able to sell it for a higher value; it will be 
interesting to study if the companies prefer then to give money to their investors early in 
the process or save in order to get a higher sale price. This is what we intend to test in 
this dissertation, by analysing the three years before and after the investment on a 
sample of buyouts from Europe from the period 2010-2013. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Private Equity and the main impacts after the buyout 
There have been many discussions between researchers about the creation of value 
by Private Equity firms. Jensen (1989) argues that PE firms apply financial, governance 
and operational engineering to their portfolio companies, thus creating value. Other 
critics, on the contrary, believe PE firms take advantage of tax breaks and superior 
information, but do not create any operational value. 
Kaplan et al. (2009) state that PE firms, as Jensen (1989) said, apply three sets of 
changes in the firms, which they too categorize as financial, governance and operational 
engineering. 
Jensen (1989) and Kaplan (1989) describe financial and governance engineering 
change associated with three main factors:  
 Management incentives in their portfolio companies, as managers have 
usually a large Equity upside through stock and options. Kaplan (1989) 
refers to a management ownership increase by a factor of four in going from 
public to private ownership.  
 Leverage, that we will discuss forward. 
 Control of PE investors on the boards, as they are more actively involved in 
governance than public boards. 
Along with these, factors on an operational level such as the operating performance 
(discussed further) and employment are considered to be the most important ones. As 
for employment, evidence suggests we cannot assume the theory that PE destroys jobs. 
From studies from the US - Kaplan (1989), Davis et al. (2011) and Lichtenberg et al. 
(1990) – we see that employment grows after the buyout, despite not as much as with 
other companies. From the UK - Amess et al. (2007) – we get same employment growth 
rate, but slower in terms of wages. Finally, from France – Boucly et al. (2008) – we 
have an exception, as the authors found greater job and wages growth.  
Asymmetric information could also be considered, but evidence suggests there is 
not an important role for firm-specific information - Acharya et al. (2011), Kaplan 
(1989). 
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2.1.1. Operating Performance 
Most of the research about benefits to the operational performance of target 
companies of a PE investment is frankly positive. Kaplan (1989), for a sample of U.S. 
public-to-private deals in the 1980s, finds evidence of this, by increases in ratios like 
operating income to sales and cash-flow to sales and decreases in CAPEX to sales. 
Smith (1990) finds similar results.  
As for Europe, the results are consistent to the U.S. in the 1980s, work that includes 
studies by Harris et al. (2005) for the United Kingdom, between 1994 and 1998; Boucly 
et al. (2008) for France, in the period 1994-2004; and Bergström et al. (2007) for 
Sweden, from 1998 to the first half of 2006. 
But there are some different findings, more concretely in more recent public-to-
private transactions. Guo et al. (2011) found modest increases in operating and cash 
ﬂow margins that are much smaller than those found in the 1980s data for the United 
States and in the European data, by analysing a sample of U.S public-to-private 
transactions from 1990 to 2006. Weir et al. (2008), for a UK sample in 1998-2004 and 
Mendes (2011), for a Portuguese sample in the period 1996-2010 find similarly modest 
operating improvements; in the Portuguese market case, although there is an increase in 
sales and assets, the operating performance was considered poor, even in relation to the 
industry, especially due to a decrease in EBITDA and CAPEX. However, Guo et al. 
(2011) also found high investor returns, which can signify a difference between these 
transactions and the 1980s ones. 
In summary there seems to be evidence supporting the existence of operating 
improvements. Nonetheless, this last wave of PE transactions achieves some different 
results, which would be an interesting topic for discussion in the future. 
 
2.1.2. Leverage 
Leverage, representative of the financial engineering value driver, is considered by 
Berg et al. (2003) as important to the creation of value, by optimizing the capital 
structure and minimizing the after-tax of capital of the portfolio company.  
Some explanations are given as to why companies increase their debt after 
investment from a PE firm. For starters, there is the tax effect, mainly considered by 
Kaplan (1989), in a sample of U.S. management buyouts in the period 1980-1986; the 
study refers some tax benefits due to increase leverage, while stating the difficulty on 
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reaching an optimal level. Opler et al. (1993) add to this, proving LBO firms use more 
debt than needed to eliminate taxes, which means that the role of debt is also related 
with another factor, the FCF. This is also analysed by Jensen (1986, 1989), who states 
the use of debt in buyouts facilitates a reduction of available FCF and enforces 
managers to attend debt payments rather than spend it inefficiently. 
Other studies about leverage, like the one from Palepu (1990), try to explain the 
better performance of equity in buyout transactions and lower risks – he shows that 
although the financial risk increases, the business risk decreases at the same time. 
Achleitner et al. (2010) and Acharya et al. (2013) explain that some of the created value 
in these operations is explained by debt, referring also that the debt-to-equity ratios 
decrease in both samples. 
In summary, debt seems to be an important factor in the value creation process, and 
companies even tend to reduce their debt-to-equity ratios, like these last two studies 
stated. 
 
 
2.2. Dividend Policies 
 
2.2.1. The Dividend Puzzle 
Why do companies pay dividends? This question has been asked for a long time, 
and scholars and researchers everywhere have tried to answer it, but still there is not a 
perfect one. 
To start explaining the Dividend Puzzle, it is important to understand what kind of 
value dividends have for both managers and shareholders. According to the model 
developed by Miller and Modigliani (1961), in a perfect capital market, without 
frictions, the existence of a dividend policy would be completely irrelevant. This 
happens as the stock that pays dividends will decrease its value, compared to one that 
does not pay: if the stock is valued at 40€ and pays dividend of 4€, the next day its share 
price would decrease to 36€.  
But the world we live in does not work that way. The markets are not perfect, and 
there are some frictions that should be taken into consideration. Black (1976) tries to 
explain this, by introducing taxes into the equation. Normally taxes are higher for 
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dividends than for capital gains, and the first ones are not deductible. In light of this, it 
is safe to assume that investors are not indifferent anymore to dividend payments, rather 
preferring to not receiving dividends at all. 
So, do dividends destroy value? Black (1976) introduces transaction costs, saying 
that it could be a factor for investors preferring shares that pay dividends; however, he 
immediately rejects it, since corporations that do not pay dividends can easily arrange 
for automatic share repurchase plan, making this argument quite ineffective to explain 
why companies pay dividends. 
Black (1976) continues his argument, saying that dividend payments can contain 
information about the company – the Signalling Theory. Managers do not usually like 
to change dividends, so they will only increase them if their prospects for the future of 
the company are good enough to support this decision in the next year. In the same way, 
they will only cut on dividend payments if their prospects for a quick recover are poor. 
In result, if the company cuts its dividend payments, its stock price would naturally fall. 
However, if the dividend changes are not due to forecasts of the company’s prospects 
(for example, if it just wants to save taxes for its shareholders), the stock price would 
eventually go back to the level they were. Thus, even though dividends have a 
signalling value, the argument is not that strong to explain why companies pay 
dividends. 
He continues to try to give more explanations to this phenomenon. Some may argue 
that dividends can be used in the trade-off between shareholders and creditors, as a euro 
that is spend in dividends is a euro that is not available to the creditors if trouble 
develops. But since the company can negotiate with the creditors to not pay dividends 
for better conditions, the argument is also pretty weak. On the other hand, not paying 
dividends is a low-cost way to raise money for future investment projects. So why do 
companies still pay dividends? 
We have then the dividend puzzle presented. If we take some of the factors, like the 
tax implications, the fact the money can be used for alternative investments, and that 
they can negotiate not paying dividends with creditors for better conditions, it would 
seem that it would be better for companies to reduce their dividend payments or not 
having them at all. Apple, for example, does not pay dividends and is still considered a 
good company to invest as its share price continues to increase. However, considering 
their signalling value, the transaction costs and the trade-off between shareholders and 
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creditors, it appears that paying dividends can be also beneficial for the company. So 
why do some companies pay dividends and others do not? 
Let us take into consideration Baker et al. (2002), who revisited the problem raised 
by Black (1976). They reached the conclusion that there are imperfections in the market 
that affect firms differently, depending on factors such as sector, time, shareholder 
structure, which makes it impossible to create a model that mathematically fits all firms 
at all times. This agrees with Fama et al. (1968), whose study used a new methodology 
for the time based on the Lintner model, who found consistent evidence on dividend 
models for individual firms, by analysing a sample of 392 companies from the period 
1946-64. 
 
2.2.2. Key Factors to explain dividend policies 
In order to then understand what factors can influence an individual firm in their 
dividend policy, Baker et al. (2002) divided them in 4 key factors: Market 
imperfections/frictions, behavioural considerations, firm characteristics and managerial 
preferences. 
 
a) Market imperfections/frictions 
Starting with the market imperfections, the authors refer to taxes, asymmetric 
information, agency and transaction costs. 
For taxes, as we previously analysed in the dividend puzzle, are usually higher for 
dividends than for capital gains, so we could assume that investors would prefer non-
paying dividend stock, at least those with high tax bracket. But some research tells us 
that this is not what really happens, especially considering firstly Bernheim (1990), 
which concludes companies still pay dividends when taxes are high; it also goes 
accordingly with Black (1976), by saying that share repurchases are stimulated by 
higher dividend taxation, being a less tax heavy solution. These share repurchases are, 
as we previously stated, one of the alternatives for the transaction costs not paying 
dividend shares represent. 
We have also to encompass here the Clientele effect, although being a more 
behavioural aspect: for example, a tax exempt investor would prefer a higher dividend 
paying stock, especially for its liquidity. However, Black et al. (1974) concluded that, 
by analysing a sample of monthly data on dividends, prices, and returns for every 
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common stock listed on the New York Stock Exchange at any time in the period 
January 1926 to March 1966, the effects of dividend yields on expected returns of a 
portfolio are almost null, for both tax exempt and high tax bracket investors, which 
would lead the focus on each kind of dividend yield (high or low paying) to an 
increased risk portfolio with the same expected returns. 
It is important also to consider Jacob et al. (2014), who found a relation between 
dividend taxation and ownership structure, by analysing corporate tax returns of all 
Swedish closely held corporations over the period 2000–2009; it concluded that the 
taxation impact on dividend pay-out is higher when the number of owners is smaller. 
We also have, leaving the perfect market from Miller (1961), asymmetries of 
information between shareholders and managers. As managers prefer to keep dividend 
policies stable, a change in dividend payments would have a signalling value for 
shareholders, as managers would only increase them if in fact they were certain of the 
sustainability of that dividend policy in the future; and would only decrease them if they 
did not believe in a quick recover from the company. 
Researching the literature on the subject, we see that Bhattacharya (1979) watches 
dividends working as a signal; Bernheim (1990) also finds evidence that stock price 
tends to rise in response to an announcement of dividend increase. A study of event 
announcements in the Cyprus market – this market has some unique features, like the 
fact most companies have a highly concentrated ownership structure and the lack of 
transparency – by Travlos, Trigeorgis and Vafeas (2015) also found evidence of 
positive impact of dividends on stock markets, which it attributes mostly to Signalling 
Theory (other explanations are related to reducing exploitations by big shareholders to 
smaller ones). 
However, we have to take into consideration the study by Black and Scholes 
(1974), that concludes that changes in dividend policy do not have a permanent effect 
on stock price; this goes accordingly with Black (1974) – the signalling property of 
dividends, although being a real factor, has more of a short term effect, since its effects 
do not last in time (considering the decrease in dividends is just for a different reason, 
like saving for an investment project). 
Agency costs are also referred in Jensen (1986), as a dividend increase will control 
management, since shareholders do not approve the excess of free cash-flows made 
available to managers, as a result of little dividend distribution. 
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b) Behavioural considerations 
As stated before, evidence suggests that it is not possible to establish a 
mathematical model working for all firms at all times, and behavioural aspects are one 
of the main reasons. Companies have different managers and shareholders, with 
different ways of thinking, so what works for one may not work for the other the same 
way. Investors’ preferences need to be taken into consideration to establish a dividend 
policy, and most of the studies on the matter are related to their rationality. As we 
discussed previously, there seems to be no evidence that dividends create or destroy 
value for the company. However, some investors prefer dividend paying shares while 
others prefer companies not to distribute funds that could be used in other investment 
projects. We can turn to the “Bird in the Hand” explanation – investors prefer to receive 
dividends instead of waiting for the possible increase or decrease of the share price of a 
non-dividend paying one. The clientele effect is also important to consider in this topic, 
as some investors will indeed prefer dividends opposed to capital gains – particularly if 
they are tax exempt. 
As the literature goes, Bhattacharya (1979), by assuming that outside investors have 
imperfect information about firms' profitability and that cash dividends are taxed at a 
higher rate than capital gains, considers the “Bird in the Hand” effect as a fallacy; 
Hamza et al. (2017), by studying companies in the technology sector in the NYSE and 
AMEX between 2010 and 2014, registered evidence that investors prefer capital gains 
to dividend payments. But maybe the most concluding study about rationality comes 
from Breuer et al. (2014), who tried to analyse cross-country differences in dividend 
policies by behavioural patterns. Their sample was composed of 43.000 firm-years from 
29 countries; the behavioural variables were registered via a comprehensive survey. 
They registered the positive effect of loss and ambiguity aversion of the investors with 
dividends, and concluded that more patient and rational investors preferred low 
dividends. 
Other important test to refer is the one by Desmukh et al. (2013), in a possible 
relation between CEO overconfidence and dividend payments – they consider a CEO 
overconfident if they overinvest personal funds in their personal company. They found 
evidence that overconfident CEOs pay lower dividends, as they perceive external 
funding as more costly, in their sample of US companies mentioned in Forbes’ largest 
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over 1984-94. They also believe dividends provide information about CEO’s 
overconfidence, due to the effects caused by them on stock markets. 
 
c) Firm characteristics 
The firm characteristics are also important to assess the dividend policy: the authors 
consider profitability, size, investment opportunities and anticipated future earnings, 
among others. 
In this topic is important to refer the Life-cycle theory, that states dividend 
payments are a function of the company’s life cycle – dividend payments would 
increase as the company matures, reaching higher payments both in maturity and 
decline phases. Many authors tried to study this phenomenon, with positive results: a 
test on this theory by DeAngelo et al. (2006), with a sample of United States publicly 
traded firms from 1973-2002, and considering the company’s stage as a function of 
RE/TE and RE/TA, concluded there is in fact a relation, as dividends are higher when 
RE/TE is higher and low otherwise. Dennis et al. (2008), in their sample from US, UK, 
Canada, Germany, France and Japan companies from Worldscope in the period 1989-
2002, concluded dividends were affected by firm size, profitability, growth 
opportunities, earned/contributed equity mix, which seemed to agree with the Life-cycle 
hypothesis. Desmukh et al. (2013) also found evidence of this on their study, 
particularly about profitability, as reduction in dividend payment was smaller in higher-
growth firms. Kajola et al. (2015), with a study from Nigerian companies also seem to 
agree with the life-cycle hypothesis, by finding some relations between the firm 
characteristics and pay-out decisions, particularly a strong positive one with firm size, 
leverage and profitability. 
 
d) Managerial preferences 
The final aspect the authors consider is the managerial preferences about dividend 
policies. As we stated before, managers seem to have a preference for a stabilization 
policy, as they perceive either a decrease or increase would have an effect on the stock 
price (although short-termed, according to evidence collected). Managers would prefer 
then to smooth their dividends, as in Bremberger et al. (2016), in their sample of 106 
firms publicly listed firms from seventeen European countries operating the electricity 
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market: they found evidence that incentive regulated firms smooth their dividends less 
than cost-based regulated firms and report higher target pay-out ratios; they also 
concluded lower smoothing is due to private firms while target pay-out is higher within 
state-controlled firms. We can also refer here to the study on CEO overconfidence by 
Desmukh et al. (2013), as an overconfident CEO would pay fewer dividends. 
 
 
In conclusion, most literature researchers would agree with Baker et al. (2002) and 
Fama et al. (1968), as all these factors would influence companies’ dividend policies, 
which would make it mathematically impossible to create a model for all firms at all 
times. This way, it is important to weigh these factors in the establishment of a dividend 
policy in further studies. 
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3. Hypothesis, Methodology and Data 
 
3.1. Hypothesis 
As stated before, the goal of this dissertation is to study if there is a change in 
dividend policies after the buyout by a PE firm. It was not to this point (to our 
knowledge) analysed by other researchers, and therefore we have no predictions in 
regard to literature. However, it would make sense for the dividends to increase in case 
the firm managers want to raise money for their investors early in the process; if their 
goal is to reach a high sale value, they will reduce their dividends so that the Equity 
value is higher at the time of the sale. 
Thus, the hypotheses in this study are: 
 
H0: Dividend policies remain the same after the buyout by a PE firm. 
 
H1: Dividend policies change after the buyout by a PE firm. 
 
 
3.2. Methodology 
The methodology we will use in this study is in line with most studies and past 
dissertations we analysed for this report. To do that analysis, as we have stated, we will 
use the period of three years before and after the buyout. For methodology purposes, we 
will use the mean of years t-3 to t-1 in relation to the buyout, and compare it with the 
changes in following t+1 to t+3 years. As with many other studies, the buyout year (year 
0), since it has both ownerships, will be excluded from the analysis. 
To do so, we developed a model, that analyses how dividends are affected by 
factors previously referred in the literature review, such as Size, Profitability, Capital 
Expenditures and Capital Structure, along with differences between the periods pre and 
post buyout. Therefore, our model will be as followed: 
          
     
                             
                   
 
                      
                          
     
  
, where i is the target company and t the year of the data (from the average of -3 to -1, to 
1, 2, 3. 
For the variable Dividends, we will use the Pay-out ratio, calculated as followed: 
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We will use a proxy for Dividends, since the database does not present data on that 
level. Therefore, the Dividends will be calculated following the formula: 
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For the variable Size, a natural logarithm of the Total Assets will be used. To 
compute the other variables, we will respectively use the ratios given by the following 
expressions: 
                   
   
     
 
             
  ;                      
   
     
 
             
  
                  
   
             
 
             
                           
  
      
 
             
  
To calculate the CAPEX variable, since there is no value for it on the database, a 
proxy will also be used. We will only consider expansionary CAPEX, because it is what 
the company actually invest to improve its productivity.  
      
               
               
   . 
There will be also used a dummy variable to differentiate between the periods 
before and after the buy-out (1 if post, 0 if pre), while the εi represents the error. 
We will proceed with two different analyses: the Univariate analysis, where we will 
observe the difference of both mean and median between pre/post-buyout years and 
their significance; the Multivariate analysis, where we made a regression analysis to our 
model, along with the corresponding F-Statistics for global significance of the model. 
 
3.3. Sample Selection 
In this dissertation we analysed the changes in dividend policies after the buyout by 
a PE firm in European countries. To do so, we used the Zephyr database, to find data on 
the buyouts that happened between the years 2010 and 2013, from the Private Equity 
tab, following the criteria Eastern and Western Europe for Geography selection. From 
this database we collected the sample of buyouts to analyse further. 
To complete the data, we got from Amadeus database the remainder of the financial 
data and indicators, mostly regarding to the dividend pay-out, capital structure, size and 
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operating performance. The sample would register the period of three years before and 
after the buyout, as the database has information only on 10 years for each company. 
The first sample, taken from Zephyr, had 3091 buyouts, following the criteria 
previously referred. However, some of the companies had to still be taken out of this 
sample. For starters, we only considered buyouts where the acquirer had a majority 
stake (>50%), since only then they would have enough power to change dividend 
policies. We also only considered targets from Europe, independent on the acquirer’s 
country. Finally, some sub-types of deals had to be taken out, like every kind of exit and 
secondary or tertiary buyout, as it is not of interest to this study the difference between 
dividend policies when the company is held by different PE firms. 
With these final restrictions, we started collecting the data from Amadeus. 
However, data in some of the companies was impossible to find, as some of the 
companies from the first sample did not exist on Amadeus, or their data was incomplete 
(we also eliminated companies where Equity < 0, due to continuity issues) – thus, we 
ended up with a sample of 307 buyouts from the period 2010-1013, where the target is 
in a European country.  
From this sample, some of the companies only had data in 2 or 1 years before the 
buyout, but since we will be doing an average of the years -3 to -1, they will still be a 
part of the study. However, tests with only the companies with complete data will also 
be done. 
 
3.4. Sample Description 
 
The next table and graph reflect how the sample is distributed, both by year and 
country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 – Buyouts per buyout year 
Year N 
2010 92 
2011 79 
2012 61 
2013 75 
Total 307 
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As we can see, with the data we could retrieve from both Databases, 2010 is the 
year with most buyouts in our sample, looking at Graph 1. If we consider Graph 2, we 
can see that most buyouts come from Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom or 
Central/Southern European countries such as Spain, France, Belgium and Italy; 
although in the first sample of buyouts there were many buyouts referring for example 
to Germany and Netherlands, but the information on those companies in the Database 
was not sufficient to enter this sample. 
The following tables refer to the descriptive statistics on each variable referring to 
the year preceding/following the buyout. 
 
 
 
Variable at average between years -3 and -1 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. N 
Dividends 50.12% 36.48% 31072.73% -31216.57% 2561.32% 307 
Size 9.59 9.52 14.68 4.09 1.48 307 
ROA 12.54% 9.95% 81.38% -112.22% 16.97% 307 
ROE 48.77% 26.32% 1525.81% -308.10% 139.86% 307 
Cap. Str. 44.12% 44.32% 96.29% 0.41% 22.24% 307 
CAPEX 4.18% 1.15% 62.74% 0 7.50% 307 
Variable at year 1 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. N 
Dividends -24.02% 9.98% 7785.59% -36897.42% 2258.74% 307 
Size 9.86 9.78 14.52 4.37 1.45 307 
ROA 10.70% 7.00% 126.52% -83.66% 19.70% 307 
ROE 31.89% 22.59% 1316.47% -1277.00% 158.09% 307 
Cap. Str. 40.92% 38.37% 99.87% 1.60% 21.80% 307 
CAPEX 7.04% 0.61% 85.39% 0 14.67% 307 
Graph 1 – Buyouts per country 
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Variable at year 2 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. N 
Dividends 141.92% 12.54% 7619.48% -1976.18% 630.44% 307 
Size 9.93 9.88 14.62 4.52 1.48 307 
ROA 9.63% 7.87% 92.91% -48.93% 16.47% 307 
ROE 29.41% 19.53% 755.83% -690.31% 98.33% 307 
Cap. Str. 41.22% 39.09% 99.77% 1.86% 21.93% 307 
CAPEX 4.55% 0.67% 91.01% 0 9.63% 307 
Variable at year 3 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. N 
Dividends -741.33% 0 106214.4% -362518.1% 21594.45% 307 
Size 9.97 9.91 14.70 5.05 1.48 307 
ROA 9.77% 6.15% 268.35% -62.11% 23.64% 307 
ROE 16.46% 16.46% 1685.02% -1358.78% 169.40% 307 
Cap. Str. 41.15% 39.25% 99.62% 0.55% 23.32% 307 
CAPEX 3.46% 0 78.27% 0 8.97% 307 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics by variable and year pre/post-buyout 
 
As we can see, the variable related to the dividends, the Payout Ratio, has a positive 
mean for the the years before and the second year after, while the first year after the 
buyout is negative; however, in the 3
rd
 year after the buyout, the mean gets more 
negative, with a value around -741% - we can see that in years after the buyout the Pay-
out ratio is higher than 100% or negative, meaning the company is not really 
considering their period results in dividend payments. The median keeps decreasing 
from around 40% to 0. Regarding the volatility, we can watch the standard deviation 
remaining stable between the years before and the first after the buyout – despite this, it 
decreases in the 2
nd
 year and increases exponentially in the 3
rd
, to 21594%. We can 
watch in the 3
rd
 year the biggest difference between the maximum and minimum. 
The size is increasing progressively through the years, both in the mean and the 
median – the volatility remains consistent, only suffering a slight decrease in the 1st year 
after the buyout. 
Regarding profitability, we can observe a slight decrease in terms of ROA, going to 
values around 10% in the mean and 7% in the median, while the standard deviation is 
around 20%.  We can also look at ROE, which has a more evident decrease, both in 
terms of mean and median. However, in this case, the  volatility is way higher, as the 
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standard deviation is sometimes even higher than 100%, and the big difference between 
maximum and minimum values. 
The capital structure suffered only a slight decrease, going to values around 40% 
after the buyout in both mean and median, while the volatility maintains its values 
around 20%. 
As for the CAPEX, it also shows decrease in its values throughout time after the 
buyout, both in mean and median – the median in the 3rd year is even 0, meaning the 
investment is slowing down throughhout the years after the buyout. The volatility 
increased during the 1
st
 year after the buyout, but ended up decreasing in the following 
years, fininshing in the 3
rd
 year with values closer to the period before the buyout. 
We have also to refer the presence of outliers in most of the variables, which we 
can easily observe by the great difference from the median to the Maximums and 
Minimums. Thus, when we are doing our regression, we will have to use some methods 
to reduce the influence of these outliers. 
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4. Empirical Results  
 
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
We started by gathering the change in mean and median in our variables between 
the years before the buyout and each year after. We tested for the significance of these 
changes using respectively the T-test and the Wilcoxon signed rank test. The results of 
this analysis are shown in the following table. 
Variable t-1…t+1 t-1…t+2 t-1…t+3 
Dividends (p.p.) -74.1408 
(-26.5005) 
91.8070 
(-23.9411) 
-791.4453 
(-36.4781)*** 
ROA (p.p.) -1.8398 
(-2.9416)** 
-2.9138** 
(-2.0722)*** 
-2.7652* 
(-3.7973)*** 
ROE (p.p.) -16.8885 
(-3.7233)*** 
-19.3649** 
(-6.7825)** 
-32.3180** 
(-9.6782)*** 
Size 0.2699** 
(0.2574)** 
0.3390*** 
(0.3641)*** 
0.3732*** 
(0.3901)*** 
CAPEX (p.p.) 2.8561*** 
(-0.5430)** 
0.3668 
(-0.4856)* 
-0.7182 
(-1.1515)*** 
Capital Structure 
(p.p.) 
-3.1977* 
(-5.9531)* 
-2.8924 
(-5.2290)* 
-2.9670 
(-5.0742)* 
N 307 307 307 
Table 3 – Changes in Mean and Median (in parenthesis) between pre/post-buyout years. Significance tests to 
changes done by T-test and Wilcoxon signed rank test. *, ** and *** represent the significance level at 
respectively 10, 5 and 1%. 
As we can see on the table, the difference between the means in the variable 
Dividends only reaches values higher than 100 p.p. (or lower than -100 p.p.) in the 3
rd
 
year, but this decrease is not statistically significant. In terms of median, there is a 
decrease comparing all years after the buyout with the years before. However, it is not 
as big as the one with the mean in the 3
rd
 year, which can mean we are in the presence 
of outliers – the change in median is also statistically significant in year t+3 at a 1% 
level. Both profitability measures register negative changes, relatively similar in ROA 
but in ROE the mean decrease is much higher than the median one. Despite this, we can 
notice significance in the difference particularly in the 3
rd
 year in both mean and 
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median. The variable size also increases in both measures, gaining significance as the 
years after the buyout go by. 
Capital Structure and CAPEX have significant difference in medians, but only in 
the 1
st
 years in mean – despite this, while the signal of the change is the same in Capital 
Structure, in CAPEX is only the same in the 3
rd
 year after the buyout. 
 
4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
We continued our study by doing a regression analysis to our model, which we 
showed before. We used two measures for profitability, ROA and ROE, so we 
estimated the model with each variable. We used the OLS method. The following table 
shows the results of our regression. We had to use the Winsorize method in order to 
reduce the influence of the outliers, at a 99% level. There was also heteroscedasticity, 
which we found using the White test, and corrected using the Newey-West method. We 
also used the Wald Test to understand the global significance of the model, showed by 
the significance of the F-Stat.  
Model 1 is our original model. We then used the Wald Test to understand the global 
significance of the model, showed by the significance of the F-Stat – thus we proceeded 
with eliminating the controlling variable with higher p-value in each model (as we can 
see in appendixes 3 and 4). We tested this using both measures of Profitability (in the 
Model 5 there is no distinction since profitability is no longer a variable in it). 
As we can observe in the table, it seems ROE is the best choice for a profitability 
measure in this model – there is a really significant relation between it and the 
Dividends variable; the model is globally significant at a 1% level and the adjusted R
2 
is 
never negative.  
We can also observe a positive relation between pre and post-buyout years in terms 
of pay-out ratio, although not statistically significant. Most of the variables in this 
sample do not have statistical significance – the only statistically significant one is 
Profitability, as we said before, especially with ROE. We also have to note the really 
low R
2
, below 1%, and although the model is globally significant (with ROE), this can 
be because of the strong relation between the variables Dividends and Profitability, as 
the others do not have statistical significance. 
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Variable 
Model # 
1 2 3 4 5 
ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE  
Pre/Post Dummy 45.0681 48.9237 43.5170 45.9574 42.6797 44.9767 46.7420 49.0002 43.6158 
Intercept -127.3297 -139.5577 -85.9775 -76.6212 -82.8704 -72.5780 48.6973 48.2893 62.4596* 
Profitability 106.5177 34.9080*** 116.9342* 32.2890*** 119.5272* 32.1084*** 107.9080* 31.7632*** - 
Size 15.6766 15.4224 14.6281 13.7447 13.5541 12.5775 - - - 
CAPEX -159.7806 -166.4374 -164.3482 -173.1923 - - - - - 
Capital Structure 73.4903 102.8559 - - - - - - - 
R
2 0.0039 0.0062 0.0032 0.0050 0.0026 0.0043 0.0017 0.0035 0.0008 
Adjusted R
2 -0.0002 0.0022 -0.0000 0.0018 0.0001 0.0019 0.0000 0.0019 0.0000 
F-Stat 1.8341 5.5510*** 1.4702 4.8192*** 1.6466 6.1651*** 1.8502 8.680*** 1.0773 
N 1228 1228 1228 1228 1228 1228 1228 1228 1228 
Table 4 – Multivariate analysis on model regression. Statistical significance of the coefficients given by *, **, *** that respectively represent 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
20 
 
4.3. Robustness Tests 
 
4.3.1. Sample description 
We have two sub-samples in this study. In the first one, we only use the companies 
whose data is complete – meaning, the ones who have values for all variables in all 6 
years considered in this study. The second one registers a change in some of the 
variables: The ROA and the ROE are calculated now using EBITDA instead of EBIT; 
while instead of using expansionary CAPEX, we use the whole CAPEX, following the 
formula: 
      
  
             
               
                                    
  
 
In the next tables and graphs, we can see how these samples are distributed by year 
and country: 
 
 
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year N 
2010 9 
2011 54 
2012 56 
2013 71 
Total 190 
Year N 
2010 80 
2011 69 
2012 58 
2013 67 
Total 274 
Table 5 – Buyouts per year in complete 
data sample 
Table 6 - Buyouts per year in other 
variables sample  
Graph 2 – Buyouts per country in complete data 
sample 
Graph 3 – Buyouts per country in other variables 
sample 
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As we can see, the second sub-sample only has 33 companies less than the original 
one, and the data either by year or country remains practically the same. However, in 
the first one, with less 117 companies, the case changes a bit. 2010 was the year in both 
other samples with more buyouts, but here it only has 9. This can be explained with the 
fact the database only registers 10 years of information, so since we use a proxy for the 
values of dividends and CAPEX we would need data from the year t-4, which is hard to 
find for companies with the buyout in 2010. Thus, 2013 is the year with most buyouts. 
In terms of the distribution per country, it remains relatively similar. 
We also computed the descriptive statistics of these sub-samples, whose tables can 
be consulted in the appendix. 
As we can see, regarding the other variables sample, since it is relatively similar to 
the original one, its descriptive statistics did not change much. We can see the big 
decrease in the pay-out ratio in the last year of the sample, the slow growth on the 
companies’ size and the decrease in profitability (ROA). However, in terms of ROE, the 
values increase comparing year t+3 with t+1 and t+2, while not reaching the values of 
before the buyout. The equity percentage relative to assets also decreases, like before; 
while the CAPEX increases in the first two years after the buyout, returning to normal 
values on the third. 
The other sample registers greater differences. Starting with the dividends, contrary 
to the other samples, they tend to increase in terms of mean; in median, however, they 
decrease after the buyout, while not assuming negative values. The size continues its 
tendency to slowly increase, while the profitability indicators decrease after the buyout. 
The equity percentage of the company also decreases like before, although not by as 
much as in the other samples. The CAPEX only registers an increase in the first year 
after the buyout, returning then to the values of before. The volatilities of all variables 
remain relatively in line with the ones from the other samples. 
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4.3.2. Univariate Analysis 
Like in section 4.1, we analysed the significance of the changes in the means and 
medians of both sub-samples using the T-test and Wilcoxon signed rank test. The 
results are shown in the following tables. 
Variable t-1…t+1 t-1…t+2 t-1…t+3 
Dividends (p.p.) 32.0467 
(-31.3802) 
58.7356 
(-36.5633) 
582.1818 
(-36.5633)*** 
ROA (p.p.) 0.6649 
(-1.6781) 
-2.3330 
(-1.5995)** 
-2.2335 
(-3.2701)*** 
ROE (p.p.) -16.1230 
(-4.3769) 
-22.2921 
(-4.3399)* 
-32.3098* 
(-9.5291)*** 
Size 0.2752* 
(0.1954)* 
0.3356** 
(0.2871)* 
0.3913** 
(0.3330)*** 
CAPEX (p.p.) 1.8327 
(-0.8913)*** 
-0.6392 
(-0.6897)*** 
-0.6994 
(-1.3292)*** 
Capital Structure 
(p.p.) 
-2.8975 
(-5.3511) 
-2.4876 
(-4.1197) 
-3.0590 
(-4.0933) 
N 190 190 190 
Table 7 - Changes in Mean and Median (in parenthesis) between pre/post-buyout years, in complete data 
sample. Significance tests to changes done by T-test and Wilcoxon signed rank test. *, ** and *** represent the 
significance level at respectively 10, 5 and 1%. 
We can see some differences between this and the original sample. For starters, in 
Dividends, although the medians remain similar, the means become now increasingly 
positive – despite this, there is only statistical significance in the median change in the 
3
rd
 year after the buyout. 
The Profitability ratios behave similarly to the original sample, despite a positive 
value on the change in the 1
st
 year – however, the significance is smaller, especially in 
the first two years. Size, like before, has a positive evolution in both measures, along 
with a higher significance level as the years after the buyout go by; Capital Structure 
has also a similar behaviour, despite not having significant differences in both mean and 
median. CAPEX also follows a similar evolution, with high significance in terms of 
median. 
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This sample is more similar to our original one. Starting with Dividends, there is a 
comparable evolution between the years before and after the buyout – however, in this 
sample we find significant differences not only in year t+3, but also in t+1, in terms of 
median. 
The Profitability variables have also a similar evolution, despite differences in ROE 
not being as statistically significant as in the other samples; while Size and Capital 
Structure maintain the similarities in their evolution with the original sample – only in 
this sub-sample the changes in Capital Structure have statistical significance. 
As for CAPEX, despite showing also a similar evolution to the original sample, we 
can observe that the changes are only significant in the 1
st
 and 3
rd
 years in terms of 
median; and in the 2
nd
 year in terms of mean. 
 
4.3.3. Multivariate Analysis 
We also tested the regression of our model in these two samples. Just like with the 
original sample, we had to use the Winsorize method to reduce the influence of the 
outliers; the test for heteroscedasticity came also positive, so we had to use again the 
Newey-West method to correct the values. The Wald test procedure for global 
significance was also repeated in the same way we did in the original sample. 
Variable t-1…t+1 t-1…t+2 t-1…t+3 
Dividends (p.p.) -99.9709 
(-36.5775)** 
68.2275 
(-33.9349) 
-897.5492 
(-36.7719)*** 
ROA (p.p.) -2.0694 
(-2.7416)** 
-3.5066** 
(-2.7043)*** 
-3.4871** 
(-4.1892)*** 
ROE (p.p.) -42.0835 
(-2.3228) 
-46.2129 
(-6.0084)** 
-37.8799 
(-8.2805) 
Size 0.2722** 
(0.2507)** 
0.3462*** 
(0.3431)*** 
0.3834*** 
(0.3729)*** 
CAPEX (p.p.) 1.1651 
(-1.0357)** 
2.4067** 
(-0.8969) 
0.4797 
(-1.3770)* 
Capital Structure 
(p.p.) 
-3.6107** 
(-5.3331)* 
-3.3991* 
(-5.5372)* 
-3.4826* 
(-3.9683)** 
N 274 274 274 
Table 8 - Changes in Mean and Median (in parenthesis) between pre/post-buyout years, in other variables 
sample. Significance tests to changes done by T-test and Wilcoxon signed rank test. *, ** and *** represent the 
significance level at respectively 10, 5 and 1%.  
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As we can see in the tables, there is not much difference in terms of our main 
variable, the Pre/Post dummy, as the coefficients are similar. However, they still do not 
have statistical significance. 
We can still watch the positive relation between the pay-out ratio and our variables 
for Profitability and Size, which seems according to the literature. We have here to 
highlight the high significance level of the Profitability variable, whereas the Size only 
has statistical significance in the other variables sample. 
The CAPEX variable gains significance in both these samples, with a negative 
signal, while Capital remains statistically insignificant. 
The two samples still remain with the main problem of the last one – the Adjusted 
R
2
 remains too small, lower than 1% (although a bit higher). Here the complete data 
sample with ROE in the model remains the best alternative, while in the other one the 
R
2
 for the models with ROA is higher. It is also important to refer that the models in 
both sample have global significance, as given by the F-Statistic. 
Comparing the results in all samples we can understand the model with ROE is 
superior to the one with ROA; and that the other variables seem to work better with the 
model. However, the problems with R
2
 continue, and it can only be improved with 
better data on the variables. 
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Variable 
Model # 
1 2 3 4 5 
ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE  
Pre/Post Dummy 44.0576 47.4560 43.7340 46.1807 44.2105 46.6176 44.3913 46.4096 40.8914 
Intercept 19.5007 12.8738 29.9469 45.5803 34.4425 50.8186 40.0186 44.7060 57.8288* 
Profitability 143.7488** 29.8579*** 145.9127** 28.8614*** 149.4191*** 28.9999*** 149.0733*** 29.0054*** - 
Size 2.6707 2.2160 2.3504 1.2071 0.5719 -0.6314 - - - 
CAPEX -258.6586** -263.8491** -257.9139** -261.9957** - - - - - 
Capital Structure 17.0288 50.3299 - - - - - - - 
R2 0.0058 0.0079 0.0058 0.0076 0.0035 0.0052 0.0035 0.0052 0.0010 
Adjusted R2 -0.0007 0.0014 0.0005 0.0023 -0.0005 0.0012 0.0008 0.0025 -0.0003 
F-Stat 3.9301*** 4.7661*** 3.4497*** 3.9211** 0.8811 3.3158** 1.3225 4.9833*** 0.8830 
N 760 760 760 760 760 760 760 760 760 
Table 9 - Multivariate analysis on model regression, complete data sample. Statistical significance of the coefficients given by *, **, *** that respectively represent 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
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Variable 
Model # 
1 2 3 4 5 
ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE  
Pre/Post Dummy 29.6478 31.1540 30.7982 30.1747 29.0290 28.1726 35.9030 34.9084 29.6745 
Intercept -178.8470* -179.3156* -205.4399** -163.0698 -208.9028** -164.7224 186.4365*** 33.8747 55.4333** 
Profitability 216.6579*** 35.7168*** 205.6856*** 34.0639*** 212.6266*** 34.5355*** 23.0764 34.3586*** - 
Size 23.8600** 22.0700** 24.5069** 21.6600** 23.5886** 20.5862** - - - 
CAPEX -180.6258* -182.9534* -176.3223* -185.8025* - - - - - 
Capital Structure -50.8404 25.6093 - - - - - - - 
R2 0.0091 0.0087 0.0087 0.0086 0.0073 0.0070 0.0036 0.0042 0.0005 
Adjusted R2 0.0046 0.0041 0.0051 0.0050 0.0046 0.0043 0.0018 0.0023 -0.0004 
F-Stat 3.6336*** 3.3749*** 4.5436*** 3.7842*** 4.7332*** 4.1969*** 4.7520*** 4.6131** 0.9148 
N 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096 1096 
Table 10 - Multivariate analysis on model regression, other variables sample. Statistical significance of the coefficients given by *, **, *** that respectively represent 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
After our tests in the different samples we analysed in this study, we can take some 
conclusions about how the dividend policies work after a PE buyout, and how they are 
influenced by other variables within the firm. 
In the beginning of this study we established our hypothesis: if the dividend policy 
of a company invested by a PE firm changes after the buyout. After our statistical 
analysis, we believe we have an answer for the research question. 
In our regression, in all samples, we found a positive relation between pay-out ratio 
and our Pre/Post-buyout dummy, meaning that it seems to increase after the buyout – 
however, this relation is not statistically significant. If we look to our tests on the 
changes of means and medians, along with the descriptive statistics we can take 
different conclusions: there seems to be a decrease after the buyout in terms of both 
mean and median in all samples except the complete data one, which is also the 
smallest. If we analyse this with the descriptive statistics, we see that in most samples 
the 3
rd
 year has a really negative value for the pay-out ratio in terms of mean. Our 
conclusion from this is that firms want to pay dividends to their investors, even when 
the results are also negative. 
In terms of median, we see it getting closer to 0, which represents one of the major 
problems for this study – the use of a proxy for dividends. Through our equation to 
calculate this proxy for the Variable, it is natural that some values would be 0 for 
dividends – for example, if the Company increases Equity by any means except a 
capital increase with negative Net Income. 
It is clear that not all companies behave this way, as the statistically significant 
negative relation with CAPEX in most samples indicates – if the company is expanding 
and investing, it is expected that dividend payments will decrease. Other control 
variables like Size and Profitability have also a significant positive relation with our 
Dividends variable, as it was expected by our research in the available literature on the 
subject. 
We also have a big problem with the really low R
2
, with the adjusted value being 
negative in some cases. To solve this, it would be necessary a better and bigger sample 
with more accurate information on the variables needed for this study. 
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In summary, we found that most companies seem to have a preference for 
increasing their dividends in the first years after the buyout, in order to reward their 
investors early in the process. However, despite being in a smaller scale, companies that 
prefer to invest on the business and reward investors with the sale value are also an 
important part of this sample. 
As a final note, we wanted to address some of the problems we had in writing this 
study, and how we believe this study can be improved: first, as we stated before, the fact 
we use a proxy for Dividends (there is not even data on Retained Earnings, only OSF) 
limits our analysis, as we do not have the real values for the variables. 
In second is the fact that we only had data on a sample of 307 buyouts from a 
sample of 3091, not even having information on all years before the buyout. Therefore, 
in order to improve this study, a bigger sample with information on all years and 
variables needed would be required – this would indeed be useful in increasing the R2. 
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6. Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 – Descriptive Statistics (complete data sample) 
Variable at average between years -3 and -1 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. N 
Dividends 52.40% 36.56% 6439.90% -3662.99% 563.96% 190 
Size 9.67 9.64 14.68 4.09 1.54 190 
ROA 11.67% 8.49% 81.38% -112.22% 17.90% 190 
ROE 48.16% 23.10% 1525.81% -308.10% 161.48% 190 
Cap. Str. 44.87% 44.45% 96.29% 2.27% 21.79% 190 
CAPEX 4.77% 1.33% 62.74% 0 8.62% 190 
Variable at year 1 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. N 
Dividends 84.45% 5.18% 4766.12% -5538.70% 669.23% 190 
Size 9.95 9.83 14.46 4.37 1.47 190 
ROA 11.01% 6.81% 126.52% -83.66% 20.55% 190 
ROE 32.04% 18.72% 1316.47% -1258.12% 155.55% 190 
Cap. Str. 41.97% 39.10% 95.88% 1.94% 20.40% 190 
CAPEX 6.60% 0.44% 85.40% 0 14.46% 190 
Variable at year 2 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. N 
Dividends 111.14% 0 6199.28% -1976.18% 539.34% 190 
Size 10.01 9.93 14.56 4.52 1.51 190 
ROA 9.34% 6.89% 92.91% -48.93% 17.23% 190 
ROE 25.87% 18.76% 638.84% -690.31% 96.60% 190 
Cap. Str. 42.38% 40.33% 97.37% 1.86% 20.90% 190 
CAPEX 4.13% 0.64% 91.01% 0 9.37% 190 
Variable at year 3 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. N 
Dividends 634.58% 0 106214.4% -1555.59% 7742.39% 190 
Size 10.06 9.97 14.49 5.44 1.50 190 
ROA 9.44% 5.22% 268.35% -62.11% 27.29% 190 
ROE 15.85% 13.57% 1685.02% -1046.28% 181.45% 190 
Cap. Str. 41.81% 40.36% 97.96% 0.63% 22.88% 190 
CAPEX 4.07% 0 78.27% 0 9.83% 190 
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Appendix 2 – Descriptive Statistics (other variables sample) 
Variable at average between years -3 and -1 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. N 
Dividends 48.39% 36.77% 31072.73% -31217.6% 2671.92% 274 
Size 9.63 9.55 14.68 4.09 1.46 274 
ROA 17.08% 15.03% 86.54% -110.95% 17.22% 274 
ROE 90.55% 38.57% 7978.01% -253.90% 491.91% 274 
Cap. Str. 43.25% 42.94% 91.59% 0.86% 21.27% 274 
CAPEX 6.30% 3.80% 62.74% 0 8.31% 274 
Variable at year 1 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. N 
Dividends -51.58% 0.19% 7784.59% -36897.4% 2387.37% 274 
Size 9.91 9.80 14.52 4.37 1.41 274 
ROA 15.01% 12.29% 130.83% -82.37% 18.49% 274 
ROE 48.47% 36.25% 881.65% -663.26% 110.80% 274 
Cap. Str. 39.64% 37.61% 93.97% 1.60% 20.67% 274 
CAPEX 7.47% 2.76% 93.38% 0 12.86% 274 
Variable at year 2 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. N 
Dividends 116.61% 2.84% 6199.28% -1976.18% 482.10% 274 
Size 9.98 9.89 14.62 4.52 1.44 274 
ROA 13.57% 12.33% 101.89% -42.44% 15.93% 274 
ROE 44.34% 32.57% 783.90% -473.91% 82.73% 274 
Cap. Str. 39.85% 37.40% 92.70% 1.86% 20.74% 274 
CAPEX 8.71% 2.90% 90.28% 0 15.25% 274 
Variable at year 3 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. N 
Dividends -849.16% 0 106214.4% -362518% 2285922% 274 
Size 10.02 9.92 14.70 5.53 1.44 274 
ROA 13.59% 10.84% 101.63% 55.11% 17.85% 274 
ROE 52.67% 30.29% 2070.05% -236.60% 162.31% 274 
Cap. Str. 39.77% 38.97% 97.81% 0.55% 22.05% 274 
CAPEX 6.78% 2.42% 99.69% 0 11.04% 274 
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Appendix 3 – Regression on Original Sample with ROA (complete 
model) 
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Appendix 4 – Regression on Original Sample with ROE (complete 
model) 
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